China's Security Strategy with a Special Focus on East Asia

by

Dr. Qin Yaqing

Qin Yaqing: I see many familiar faces here; many of them are friends, and I'm happy to be here to discuss with you about China and its foreign policy, its security strategy, especially in East Asia. I revised the title a little bit to fit what I am going to say, that is: "China's Foreign Policy Choices and Security Strategy in East Asia."

China's Foreign Policy Choices

First, let me go to the topic of China's foreign policy choices. If you go to China, and talk with taxi drivers, talk with students, talk with people on the street, and in many other circles, you can hear different voices. Generally, there are three possible policy choices. The first is aggressive nationalism. The Second policy choice is utilitarian realism. And the third policy choice is cooperative internationalism. Chinese society is becoming more pluralistic, so you hear different voices.

With aggressive nationalism, you often see some people talking about strong power, real politick, and that as a rising power China should play a more aggressive role in international relations. By utilitarian realism, basically I refer to the kind of mindset that believes China is not strong enough, although it is developing very fast, so it shouldn't be very aggressive at the moment. Why is it that when China becomes very strong, it will not be bullied by anyone? Power is still a basic element here. The difference between the first policy, aggressive nationalism, and the second, utilitarian realism, is that time is a great matter.

The third policy is cooperative internationalism. This is a different mindset where people believe that China is developing very fast, that China should become a full member of international society, that China should cooperate internationally, and that China should do what it can to maintain the international order, plus the regimes, rules and norms that go with that order. For any important foreign policy issue, these three different ideas reflect different approaches. For example, the so-called peaceful rise of China is a big topic in China. Aggressive nationalists believe there will not be a peaceful rise. A rise? Yes. But peaceful? No.

Any big power, many people believe, will rise violently. It will especially become a natural enemy of the existing power. Cooperative internationalism on the same issue sees the whole thing differently and believes that China will develop and has been developing very fast, and will become a peaceful and responsible member of the international society. On the streets, you hear people talking about different things and sharing different ideas, but the most important one is: what have the decision makers done? What foreign policy choices have they made? I would argue, basically, that the decision makers are currently between the second and third policy choices men-

tioned above. And I would further argue that they are moving more toward the third, that is, cooperative internationalism. The question is, why?

China's Foreign Policy Moving Toward Cooperative Internationalism

I give you three answers or indicators for this. The first is that I believe China has been redefining its national identity. Second, China has been reconstructing its strategic culture. Third, China has been reconsidering its national security interests. Fundamental changes have been taking place in China, so its foreign policy has been showing some new ideas and new choices. This is what I define as national identity: it's not exactly an identity formed in a domestic society, it's an identity in terms of its relations between the domestic society and the international society. That is what a state is in relation to an international society, in terms of identifying between the two.

By this definition, we can see that there are three types of national identity in today's world. We have status quo states, detached states, and revisionist states. This model or diagram basically shows the degree of identification and also the different types of identity along the curve (**See Chart 1**). Usually, if you look at a revisionist state, its main purpose is to change the international order and the international system. A detached state is quite irrelevant; it doesn't care, unless its own state interests are at stake. A status quo state is in positive identification with international society and also tries to maintain the status quo or existing order. These are the three different types of states.

My argument is that China has been moving along this curve, from the negative area up to the positive area. More or less, China is now a status quo state in the international system. It's a member of international society. I don't want to go into detail, but let me show you three indicators. These are the three periods I have defined, which show the changes over the years (**See Chart 2**). The three indicators include interdependence within the economy, so this is the foreign trade as a share of national GDP (**See Chart 3**). In 1980, China's foreign trade as a share of GDP was only about 13%. Over the years, it has been increasing very dramatically. By the year 2002, it was 50%, and last year it was over 60%. It shows a much higher degree of economic interdependence between China and international society than in the past. This is the first indicator.

China's Membership Increasing in International Organizations

The second indicator is from Alastair Iain. This is China's international organization memberships in a comparative perspective (**See Chart 4**). From this, you can see that China has joined almost as many international organizations as India, Japan and the United States. A third indicator illustrates how China tries to participate in multilateral international conventions (**See Chart 5**). If we look at the figures there—from 1949, when the People's Republic of China was founded, up to 1979—in thirty years' time, China joined thirty-four multilateral international conventions. And from 1980 to 2002, China joined two hundred and twenty. Last year, China joined seventeen of these conventions. By last year, China had joined many multilateral international conventions. These conven-

tions show international regimes, norms and rules, so it's an indicator of China's identification with international society. This is the first answer, and then we come to the second.

This is not an idea I developed. This is, again, something I borrowed from Alastair Iain, that of the strategic culture aspect. The concept itself is somewhat complicated. I have tried to sanctify it, to make it a little bit too simplistic, perhaps, but this is very clear. It's about people's attitude, or a nation's attitude toward the strategic environment. For the first dimension, we have war. What is the role of war in human affairs? Some people believe it's aberrant. Some people believe it is inevitable. How about the nature of rivalry, the second dimension? Some people believe it's zero sum, and some people believe it's non-zero sum or a variable sum. Rivalry could be a win-win situation, or it could be a lose-lose situation.

The third dimension is the efficacy of violence, or how effective violence is as an instrument of foreign policy. Some people believe it's effective, whereas some people believe that it's not. According to this definition, we can use a diagram to illustrate these three dimensions (**See Chart 6**). If you believe the role of war is inevitable in human affairs, or that that violence is very effective, and the nature of rivalries is always zero-sum, basically you have a conflictual strategic culture. You tend to go to conflicts. On the other hand, if you go to the lower end, then you tend to have a cooperative strategic culture. These two different types of strategic cultures very much shape your foreign policy, in terms of the use of force.

China Is Pursuing Cooperative Strategic Culture

I don't want to give you a detailed analysis. Basically, I have used content analysis to discuss this (**See Chart 7**). But the result is like this: before 1979, on all three dimensions, the indicators are very high. Since that time, the indicators have gone down, showing that China has been pursuing more and more of a kind of cooperative strategic culture along all the dimensions.

The third indicator is security interests. (**See Chart 8**). I would like to stress here that the first indicator is the most important, because your identity basically shapes your behavior. If you go to security interests, it's closely related to your identity with international society. I developed this model two years ago to illustrate how people think about security issues or security interests. We have these two axes: the horizontal axis shows that at the national level, you have different dimensions of security concerns, while the vertical axis shows your different levels of security interests—the nation-state is not the only major concern. You have above it international security, regional security and world security. Below it, you have societal and individual, or as the United Nations defined it in 1994, "human security." I use an oval to illustrate the traditional security interests of nation-states, that is, at the nation-state level, with a focus on political and military security.

My argument is that from 1949 to 1969, China's security interests focused exclusively on political and military dimensions (**See Chart 9**). From 1970 to 1979, the military became almost the sole security concern. And from 1980 to the pre-

sent, economic security has become an increasingly important concern of the leaders. Together with economic security, we see a multilateral and multidimensional security interest within China. That is to say, along the vertical lines, nation-states have had not only a major concern about security, but regional and societal dimensions have also become important concerns of decision makers.

Along the horizontal line—ecological, food, economic, informational, and cultural aspects—all these security concerns have appeared on the agenda. What does this mean? It means clearly one thing. If you focus exclusively on the area covered by the oval, that is very much a zero-sum mindset. But if you go outside the oval and spread into all directions, the more you spread, the more cooperation you need.

I just want to give you one more indicator. I have several, but this one might be the most conspicuous and the most telling. Look at the international armed conflicts China has been involved in since 1949 (**See Chart 10**). First is the Korean War, second is the China-India border war, third is the China-Soviet Union border war, and the last one was the China-Vietnam border war. All of them occurred before 1979. Since 1979, China has not been involved in any international armed conflicts.

China's Security Strategy in East Asia

Then let me move to the second part of this presentation: China's security strategy in East Asia. We can use arguments from the first part to analyze China's security strategy in East Asia. I basically see a three-ring concern. The first is sovereignty and territorial integrity. That's an important part because China still has problems with this, for example with Taiwan, or on some islands in the South China Sea, or separatist movements in some areas, such as border areas. So sovereignty and territorial integrity is the first ring. The second ring is the friendly neighborhood, and the third is regional stability.

Before we go to these three rings, we should first remember that since 1979 and over the past two decades, China has been very steady on one thing: that the priority of the whole nation is to develop a national economy and to achieve social development. That's the first priority. Based upon this, China needs a stable environment, thus we have these three rings. In regards to sovereignty and territorial integrity, if you look at East Asia, two issues are the most inconspicuous: Taiwan and the South China Sea Islands.

At the second ring, you want to see a friendly neighborhood. In East Asia you have ASEAN—the ten countries of the Southeast Asian area—Japan and the Korean Peninsula. If you look to Asia as a whole, there are more neighbors, but if you come to East Asia, these are roughly the neighborhood. Then we move to the third ring, regional stability in Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia and the Asia-Pacific. I want to emphasize the Asia-Pacific, because it is outside of East Asia, but it is still related. Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia are two important areas for China to think about.

If our theoretical analysis in the first part stands, then we would expect China to take the following approaches to realize its security objectives in East Asia. The first approach is security through community, because you are a member of the

international society at the same time that you are a member of the regional area's community. The second approach is security through institutions, such as international institutions. The third approach is security through cooperation. And security through interdependence, referring more to economic interdependence, is the last approach. So the key idea here is that any country or nation state needs security. Security has different dimensions and different levels. The key idea is how you think you can achieve your security.

China Attempts to Achieve Security Through Community

In human history, you have different methods: you can use force, you can use war, but you also can use dialogue and cooperation. The key question is which of these you think is more important in today's world. I argue that China has been trying to achieve security through community. This is a recent development. Before 1979, Asian countries, especially East Asian countries, didn't have a strong awareness that they should form a regional community. For example, some of the powers inside the region didn't have the intention. Some of the powers outside the region didn't have the willingness to see it. But 1997 was a critical year because the East Asian financial crisis took place. Suddenly, nations inside this region felt they should have a sense of "we-ness."

Korean people and scholars, first put forward the idea of an East Asian Community by the East Asian Vision Group. The Japanese agreed, and the Chinese seemed to be quite active in this respect. I'll tell you one thing, the East Asian Studies Center, which was just set up in our university as a track two organization, works for the promotion of an East Asian Community. China is the general coordinator for the Network of East Asian Think Tanks (NEAT). Our president is the general coordinator. The purpose is very clear: how to promote, despite all the difficulties, a regional community. Europe has set an example.

Last year, China joined the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia. China was the first major power outside ASEAN to join this treaty, and China has initiated the establishment of the East Asian Free Trade Area. China has also signed a joint declaration for promoting cooperation among China, Japan and the Republic of Korea. They are the three countries outside of ASEAN. Through these efforts, it's clear that China is pursuing a way of helping to build a regional community.

Now we come to the second approach, security through institutions. Since 1997, many institutions have been established, and a lot of effort has been made to build institutions. I list some here (**See Chart 11**). For example, Ten Plus Three is ASEAN's ten countries, plus China, the Republic of Korea and Japan. Ten Plus One consists of China and the ASEAN ten. In addition, you have APEC, the ASEAN Regional Forum and ACD (Asian Cooperation Dialogue). I just attended this dialogue last month in Qingdao. As co-chair of the track two organizations, we held many discussions about our common problems. For example, food security, energy cooperation, and how to increase Asian competitiveness as an East Asian region present some challenges. It is important to attend conferences where the foreign ministers also discuss important issues for coop-

eration. It seems that there are still many difficulties, but now people have realized that they should cooperate, they should move forward toward regional or at least economic integration. Then we will have more security.

The third approach is security through cooperation. This is another aspect that has been very clear in the past few years, for example, the six-party talks over the Korean nuclear issue. This has encouraged all the parties come to the negotiation table and to relax tensions, to some extent. The Declaration on the Conduct of the Parties in the South China Sea was signed in 2002. We know there are several countries, who have claimed sovereignty over some small islands. This is an important declaration because all sides agreed they would not use force to solve the dispute. There are also frequent visits between Chinese leaders and the leaders from this region.

The last approach I would like to show is security through economic interdependence. This is the figure in 2003 of interregional, international trade (**See CHART 12**). China's total international trade volume is roughly about 851 billion U.S. dollars. Among these figures, trade with Asian countries reached almost 500 billion. This shows a high degree of economic interdependence between China and Asian countries. Then we list the East Asian countries, including Japan, the ROK and ASEAN. Put together, all three countries accounted for 32%. If we look at this situation, we should have a clearer picture about where China is in East Asia and how China thinks about security issues, especially what kind of methods or approaches China thinks it should take to achieve its security.

Let me summarize China's security choices. The first is the so-called New Security Concept. This is the concept put forward a few years ago by Chinese leaders. Its core part is security through cooperation, or through mutual security. That is to say, you don't have unilateral security in today's world; you cannot make your neighbors insecure while you are secure. I have never seen leaders say this, but some people say Asia is not China's Asia, but China is Asia's China. You want to achieve your security through security with other countries, using institutionalism. So far, I can tell you that in the East Asian Studies Center, one of our important jobs is to see how to strengthen or build institutions with Asian or East Asian cooperation.

Taiwan Problem Could Disturb Regional Integration

The next security choice is open regionalism. I call it open regionalism here because China believes that when you have regional integration, it should not be a closed process, it should be open. Open means open to outside countries and players, especially including the United States. If we say that there are some important issues which could almost completely disturb what I have just described, what would they be? I think what most people discover comes immediately to mind is the issue of Taiwan. I would agree that it's a big issue, a troubled issue, and that it's always there.

When we came to the first part, I identified the three different attitudes or different policy choices. Those people who believe in aggressive nationalism always believe that China should take over Taiwan as soon as possible and use force, if necessary. And the third school always

believes that resolution through peaceful means is the best way. But Taiwan is a problem here, and the potential is very dangerous.

The second thing I would like to say is that it's quite dangerous to disturb the whole course. Even to reverse China's course towards peaceful development would be a very bad interaction between China and other major powers. This is not very much up to China. I would argue that if the new conservatives in the United States have a very strong voice, they should put great pressure on the Chinese political process.

We hope to have a future in East Asia and in the East Asian regional security community, or even in the non-security community. We hope to have an all-around community—an economic, secure, social community, and so on—so that East Asia and Asia as a whole will become an active, responsible and positive player in international affairs. I think with the efforts of human beings and with human agency we can achieve this, although there are going to be many difficulties.

Jeff Legro: To paraphrase a famous Edgar Snow quote, you can only speak authoritatively about China if you've studied it less than two weeks or more than 20 years, and so, I've got some good news and some bad news for you today. The good news is that Michael Swaine and I are both going to speak authoritatively, but Michael Swaine is the only one who has studied China more than twenty years, so that puts me closer to the other category.

It's especially a pleasure to comment on the remarks of Qin Yaqing, who is an exceptional person, quite unique on either side of the Pacific. He's schooled in both eastern and western theories and methods, he's knowledgeable about both scholarship and the policy process, and he's a person of exceptional insight and integrity, so it's a real honor to be able to follow him on any podium.

I want to take on three questions that have to do with his important discussion of the concept of identity. The first question is: Does China truly identify with international society as it exists today? The second question is: If it does identify with that society, does that imply peace and stability? And the third question is: If China does identify with international society now, will it continue to identify with it in the future, perhaps when it's substantially stronger?

China Increasingly Accepts International Society

Does China identify with international society? There has been substantial change in the Chinese vision of international society and the acceptability of the dominant rules of that society. But remember, the origins of that society are in the Atlantic area, the European American area, and that society has a history that also is despised in China, and that's the history of imperialism and colonialism. Does China now accept this society? Well, in many ways, I would say yes. Yet if you go, for example, to the website of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, you'll read a statement there—and similar words can be found by Jiang Zemin's address to the party Congress—that China calls for a new economic and political order that is fair and rational. And, of course, that means that the existing one is not fair and rational, and that

somehow their current society might change.

There's an element of revisionism in there, but I'm not sure that same revisionism would be objected to by many European countries today, actually. But there's another element about China's revisionism that may be somewhat deeper. Some argue that today democracy is a norm in international society, that the dominant economic and political powers are all democracies of some sort. I actually think that China does identify with that, to a certain degree, but it certainly doesn't identify with it as fast as many other powers and people would like.

And there's an additional question, too: which international society does China identify with? I think China would be most happy with the international society that existed just after the concert of Europe, when the powers could agree on general principles that adjudicate international relations, but they would agree to disagree on internal political orders. This becomes an important question because many people believe that, in fact, international society may be in flux today. Traditional rules about intervention, about not attempting to reorder the internal societies of other countries, may be up for grabs.

Second, if China does identify with international society, does that imply peace? Does it imply stability? Well, judging from international societies of the past, the answer would be "No," because the international rules of society as we know them today allow for conflict over particular issues—or at least the rules are not clear cut. Sometimes the rules of international society and the precedents that have been set are somewhat worrisome. If we remember when Japan joined international society, it took up the practices of international society at the end of the 19th century, which were imperialism and colonialism. They were just doing what everyone else was doing. Mao Tse-dung once said to the United States, "Why do you involve yourself with Taiwan Island, when I don't involve myself with Long Island?" The United States has set a precedent of declaring a zone, a sphere of influence, within its hemisphere. That would be a worrying precedent for China to follow.

Desirable Identity Change Occurring in China

International society does not mean a lack of conflict. Still, I agree with the basic thesis that there is change in Chinese identity, and that identity is a desirable change. It is less worrisome if a rising power accepts the rules of international society, and China has increasingly accepted and involved itself in more of those rules. The tricky question, of course, is if China does identify now, will it do so in the future? According to Qin Yaqing's typology of different views of international society—status quo, detached, or revisionist—China has gone through several changes since the Qing Empire, when it was detached. During the Republican period we might say it was integrated or trying to integrate itself. Under the early Mao period it was completely revisionist. It then moved to somewhat detached during the Cultural Revolution, and it has now become integrated. Those are fairly rapid changes in a relatively short period of time. If they can happen so quickly, then China's current integration might easily again revert to revisionism.

A central issue then is what are the sources of such changes? Can we predict when these changes will occur? And, of course, the big counter argument that the China hawks make is that as China's power grows, so too will its appetite grow. This is the supposed "rule" of international politics. I personally don't agree with that. Appetite or international ambition does not always grow with power, and of course the simplest example of that is the U.S. in the interwar period. After World War I the U.S. was the predominant power in the international system, and it largely withdrew from that system.

But it does highlight the importance of how we are to understand the determinants of identity change. How sticky is identity? Will identity endure while other fundamentals do not? Qin Yaqing posits a potentially important development that is good news for status quo powers, assuming for a minute America is a status quo power. Yet, the thesis also points to some key questions which are worth thinking about.

Michael Swaine: I think all the major points have certainly just been raised, brought to mind by Yaqing's excellent presentation. They are really fundamental issues. On the one hand, what we do see in China today is certainly a transition in thinking about China's relationship to the international order, about the utility of international organizations, and about the efficacy of force. All those different criteria that Yaqing related causes you to really see some significant thinking going on in China, and it's not just limited to academe, scholars and people who aren't in government. I think it does have an influence on thinking in government. And it certainly marks a huge contrast to what occurred prior to the reform era.

But from my perspective, some of the fundamental issues of the long term still remain, for reasons that have already been raised. You can explain every aspect, virtually, of China's behavior in the last fifteen or twenty years in the international system from a very realist perspective. China is pursuing a very logical, very comprehensive strategy of accentuating its strengths, minimizing its weaknesses, and emphasizing the positive aspects of its rise to power, in order to reduce the concerns and anxieties of other countries in the region and outside the region, and particularly those of the United States. Yet at times, it's really fighting among itself within the Chinese leadership over how to deal with specific tactical questions. One such example is how far one should push in dealing with Taiwan, in order to try to prevent that issue from destabilizing the overall strategy by producing a confrontation with the United States. But at the same time, China would have to ensure that the issue does not develop in a way that would threaten the very security of the Chinese leadership, because it is seen in those terms as a question of leadership stability and leadership security. And that is a constant judgment factor of balancing those tactical questions.

China Pursuing A Sensible Foreign Policy

But the larger principles of maximizing your influence by entering the international order, increasing the level of economic foreign trade involvement in other states, increasing the amount of membership in international organizations and increasing the amount of in-

volvement in multilateral conventions, all make perfect sense. These principles make sense from the point of view of any power that is seeking to increase its reach and influence as a result of its increasing economic and other capacities. At the same time, it wants to shape and influence that environment in ways that don't counter its rise. It's a smart move. A stupid move would be that as China's power grows, it also pushes away from the international order and seeks to pursue a very unilateralist kind of path.

You really have to get down to some fundamental questions that have already been referred to. Yaqing refers to China's view of security as security via an Asian community. The implication of that is the notion that you will be able to establish security as China emerges in its power and capability, while the United States is out there as the dominant power in the region and in the globe. Yet you will nonetheless be able to fashion some kind of an Asian community that will overcome the concerns of the security dilemma, and that China's rise won't create anxiety in the United States and in Asia. In addition, China would provide credible means of security that present alternatives to alliances for the countries in the region. This is the current basis of security in much of Asia and in their bilateral security alliances, as well as the position of the United States as the dominant security guarantor across the region.

How do you transition from that structure to this very amorphous sense of community when you don't have the underlying similarity of culture, in terms of both political culture and other types of security culture in the region that you have in Western Europe? Western Europe, through a process of tremendous tumult, conflict, conflagration and political evolution, has finally been able to fashion a cohesive, multilateral security order, and yet one that is based on alliance. It is a formal security alliance structure in most, if not all of Europe, under girded by a very common set of cultural norms. And in the absence of that, how are you able to establish a community in Asia, in the context of the dynamic changes that are coming out of China? The concerns that that is creating still presents, to my mind, an open question. For the long term, it's a very significant open question. You can talk about reducing security anxieties by having large amounts of interaction, intercourse of various types and dialogue, as Yaqing has said. And reducing concern is exactly what China is trying to do. But you don't eliminate the fundamental problem using dialogue, it seems to me, unless you can come up with a much more viable means of making that transition away from security alliances and what they represent, and at the same time reassure the United States that whatever you want to transition towards will still maintain security, stability and prosperity in the region. And then you're left with the whole question of U.S. dominance.

U.S. Presence in Region Reassures Asian Countries

There is a fundamental assumption, I think, among many U.S. policy makers, that stability in Asia is a result of—in maritime Asia, at least—the military dominance of the United States in that region. It's the only power that's able to cross that region to deploy forces, both rapidly and with significant effect. Would China's vision assume that that should end? And if so, what do you re-

place it with? Because that capability serves a function, not just for the United States, but for other countries in the region. They are reassured by it. They're concerned over it, to some degree, because they don't want it to lead into a confrontation. But at the same time, I think they're reassured by it, because it tends to balance off other possibilities that they wouldn't want to see. Other possibilities would be, for example, a China-dominant or Sino-centric Asia, or a Japanese-dominant Asia.

How do you deal with those basic great-power concerns over the long term? Again, I don't think there is an easy answer to any of this. The question is also about common culture, one of political evolution in China. As the comment was made, most of the powers that are involved in positive sum security relationships with one another tend to be democracies. It's not that democracies cannot confront each other or fight with each other. I don't really ascribe completely to the so-called democratic peace argument. But nonetheless, there is an argument, particularly in the Asian context, that when you have an increasing number of peaceful, viable democracies, and you have the largest continental power that's not a democracy, you have to really deal with that fundamental issue.

This is as important as Yaqing's mentioning that it is what U.S. power and neoconservatives might do in the future that makes the Chinese government nervous. We sort of flip it around and say it's a lot of what the Chinese government does in its political process and its concentration of power. And the suspicions this creates in the minds of the region in terms of ultimate objectives is also a variable, an independent variable. And that movement towards democratization in China, although it's by no means a panacea—you'll still have controversies over all kinds of issues, particularly territorial sovereignty and questions like that—but you could, over time, potentially reduce the propensity towards confrontation because you have a similar democratic process within China to what other states have. That's another big question mark that has to be addressed when looking at these issues. But Yaqing has certainly struck on all the major points and makes a very strong, convincing argument about what is changing in China today, and why this is a very important phenomenon. To a great extent, at present China certainly is a power that is trying to reinforce many aspects of the status quo for its own interests' sake. And yet, as has been said, the ultimate implications of this remain to be seen. They can be influenced, certainly, by what other powers do, particularly the United States, but the ultimate implications of it, I think, remain unclear.

China Does Not Fully Accept U.S. Position in Asia

One last point. I'm yet to be convinced that in China's emergence and greater involvement in the international order and institutions you'll see a full acceptance of the status quo. By that I mean that I am yet to be convinced that the distribution of power in the system, the United States' position in Asia in particular, will be accepted by China as a very long term and likely permanent kind of situation, as much as you can refer to permanency in the international system. The underlying assumption in much of China's assessments is that a better order should be formed out of a

greater sort of diversity of power centers, or multipolarity. The current unipolar world is one that is going to last for a lot longer than what many Chinese leaders thought was the case five or ten years ago, but it's not the ideal situation. The better situation is one in which U.S. power is significantly reduced, particularly in Asia. I don't see a whole lot of evidence that China has completely dealt with that issue by what it is doing in Southeast Asia and other areas, signing the kind of agreements it's signing and taking the kind of stances it's taken, and I think it really needs to do that over time. I think there's a very strong commitment, as I see it, in Chinese leadership circles, that China's interests are not being served by the existing power structure in Asia, in the way in which I just defined it.

Q & A

John Ikenberry: It seems to me that there are two types of issues that are most important in this discussion. One is that we all know China has embarked on a quite impressive, and to many people a surprising foreign policy of engagement, of reassurance in the region. One scholar has called it a neo-Bismarckian strategy of a rising state engaging neighbors so that their rise will be more comfortable and more acceptable to their neighbors. But, of course, we all know the story of Bismarck and post-Bismarck Germany was not one that has a happy ending. So the question really is, how sustainable is such a strategy, which begs the question of how deeply rooted it is, what are its societal foundations, and what could dislodge it? And the other question—and I think both Michael and Jeff were raising this—is that underneath the rhetoric of community, of institutions, of internationalism, there can be very different specific policies and strategies that can lead to conflict. And in fact, you can use the ideas and norms of the international community that make you look like a status quo power to then turn around and use them in quite radical ways to oppose the existing system, as has been done before.

One might ask the question: Is the Chinese conception of an emerging Asian community, as Michael suggested, consistent with or ultimately in profound opposition to the current system of bilateral alliances, the so-called hub and spoke system? One could argue that, in fact, China can easily take advantage of the existing security system, a kind of hub and spoke system, by becoming yet another spoke. It is easier to integrate into a bilateral system of security than it would be for a country outside of Europe to integrate into the Atlantic system, because it's a much more normal, dense, multilateral structure. Whereas in Asia, the structure is a fairly simple one, and if you're willing to develop a special relationship with Washington, in the array of bilateral hub and spoke arrangements, you can integrate and it can be a stable system, if you're willing to play by those particular American-centered rules of the game. The question would be, as you respond to your discussants and what I've just said, how consistent or inconsistent is the longer, medium-term, as opposed to short term security vision of East Asia with this American-centered, unipolar, hub and spoke structure?

Qin: Whether the development of China's foreign policy orientation will be sustainable is really a very important question. The three processes I described, including identity, strategic culture and

security interests, are ongoing processes started basically from the year when reform and opening up as a policy were set up in China. In the past two decades we have seen this track. As to the question of whether it will continue, I believe it most likely will continue, unless some unexpected event occurs. I mentioned, too, that if Taiwan becomes a big problem, these three processes could be reversed. It's a two-way street that depends both on China and on the international community, on all of the players. We hope it will continue and will be sustainable.

My second response is about the Asian community. In regard to this Asian community, just now Michael talked about China's increased influence in Asia and in the world through all the different approaches, including international institutions and other things. That is quite rational and realistic, I agree, but otherwise, what could China do? As Michael said, the other way could be very stupid, so this seems to be the only way China can follow now, wisely, yet some people don't think it is a wise way. That's the problem.

The third thing is about this hub and spoke system. I mentioned open regionalism, that an Asian community will take some ideas from the European community, but would not be a complete identical copy of it. The Asian community now has two conspicuous features. The first is that it's open. Open means that the system of bilateral alliances will stay there. Second, it's open to outside players. I have mentioned outside players, particularly the United States. China's vision is that the United States should play a role there; they don't want to drive the United States away. That outcome is not only impossible, but also undesirable. That is what I mean by open regionalism. When we use the hub and spoke, we can see several hubs, perhaps, with different spokes.

The fourth comment, quickly, is about Jeff's argument, that is, what kind of international society China accepts, because Chinese leaders have repeatedly said we need to establish a new economic and political order. China accepts the international society, international norms. This is the international society existing and accepted, as a whole, by the world. It's not nation-oriented or centered, and it includes members of almost all continents. As I understand it, the new economic and political order basically is an improvement of the existing one, not the destruction of the existing one.

Questioner: We're all familiar with the dramatic growth of private enterprise in China. I'm wondering if you've found any evidence that private enterprise has developed at least a nascent structure for articulating its own interest in China's international policies, and what difference that might make.

Qin: I have discussed this issue with several American friends in the past. Private enterprises account for a large amount of the Chinese economy and these private sectors play an increasingly important role in China. As for how it has a voice, or its interest in foreign policy, I'm not quite sure, but I can give you an example. We just set up an East Asian Studies Center to promote integration in East Asia. We have taken a new approach this time, that is, a tripartite approach. We try to incorporate government, private business and scholars, so when we have conferences and

discussions, these private business people will be invited. Sometimes they give us some money, but more than that, we want to get their ideas. For example, if they want to invest, where do they want to go in the East Asian region? If they want to have energy cooperation, what kind of cooperation do they want? These days we write proposals. This is perhaps one of the channels in which the voices of private business can get into policy.

Questioner: Dr. Qin, could you elaborate a little bit on what you said about the neoconservatives and what your interpretation is of their line on China and Taiwan, particularly in regards to arms sales to Taiwan?

Qin: This is the issue I mentioned which is a big headache for all the parties now concerned. When I think of a single major event that could disturb the whole course and the three processes I identified, it would be the Taiwan issue, because it's not that simple. If we think about U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, on the one hand, China is strongly opposed to these arms sales. The whole thing is not that easy. If you look at the arms sales to Taiwan, look also at the tendency of Taiwan's claim or intention to become independent. The Chinese believe these issues are related. China doesn't want to use force, but, as part of China, China claims sovereignty over Taiwan. In today's international system, it's rightful for China to use force, if necessary. China doesn't want to use force, but at the same time, China does want to deter Taiwan's independence. In this whole process, the sale of arms to Taiwan has become an issue there, because China believes that the more weapons Taiwan gets, the stronger willingness it will have to become independent, especially by the present ruling party. That makes the whole thing very complicated.

I don't have any particular comment on this, but I think for this issue, it's important for China and the United States to think carefully about it. If you look at the solutions to the Taiwan crisis—maybe it's not a crisis—the first time in 1995 or 1996, to this time last year, or the end of last year over to the first few months of this year, the approaches that China has taken are somewhat different. From the different approaches you can see something important that involves different major players in the region and in the world.

Avoiding Coercion Between China and Taiwan Integral to U.S. Policy

Swaine: I think there is a sort of two-sided aspect of this, from the perspective of individuals who look at this issue and call themselves neoconservatives. On the one hand, there is a very strong desire to ensure that Taiwan is free from coercion. Also bound up in that view, in the view of some of these individuals, is the desire to ensure that Taiwan does not become dominated by China over time, because that would strengthen China's position strategically. That's a long-term perspective which I don't think drives the thinking of many people in Washington. But the idea of avoiding coercion is very important, and so strengthening Taiwan in the context of a rising China, of China growing more powerful, is a very logical thing to do, and so you do it. Unless you can resolve or derive a political solution to that problem, you've got to maintain that balance. Then the question becomes how much of a balance is necessary, and how do you coordinate it

with the political side of the dimension? There are differences over that.

But the other side of the equation is, from the broader perspective of the priorities of what you call neoconservatives and where they are today, it certainly isn't Taiwan. It's certainly not even China. Their priorities are the Middle East and Iraq, what they are struggling with every day to try to keep this situation from sliding into complete and utter chaos. There they have a very strong need to have a cooperative relationship with China. They are motivated to make sure Taiwan does not upset that situation. They want to control that from the point of view of both Taiwan and the mainland, the mainland by not using force and Taiwan by not provoking China into using force.

Qin: I think the fundamental issue is not where the neo-conservatives look, it's whether they have a mindset of higher pressure, high, realistic, power politic thinking, together with a strong ideology that will make the world a better place. That is the key, fundamental issue of the neocons.

Questioner: I was interested in an article I read last week, quoting two Chinese military officers who had given a paper down at a conference in Singapore, I think at an ASEAN-China conference, pushing increased cooperation between ASEAN and China on an operational level, particularly in the maritime security arena. And I thought this was particularly interesting. I'm interested in your perspective on the likelihood of a more active China in this arena. I know China has traditionally really begged off on playing a more active, operational role, no matter how much urging has come from other parties. I know China has been an observer in a number of exercises, but still has pushed off from being an active participant. Is this a new trend that may be emerging, that China is stepping forward to and actually wanting to play a more active role in the operational arena, especially in the maritime arena?

China's Military Seeks More Involvement in International Operations

Qin: First, you asked whether it's a trend or not. I cannot predict whether it is a trend, but I think this is perhaps the orientation. The fundamental issue here is that China's military wants to have trust-building with other military forces of other countries. Not only with Singapore, but I think at the first level, China's military officers have been more involved in international operations, like operations organized by the United Nations. At the second level, they have been more involved with other major powers. Third, at the regional level, China does want to improve its military relations with other countries, especially—and I quote Michael here—if China simply wants to reduce the worries of other countries, China should build up mutual trust among the Chinese army and foreign armies. But whether it's a trend or not, I don't quite know.

Improved Military Relations with Neighbors Logical for China

Swaine: Not commenting on the specifics of that, but instead on the general question you're raising, it's clear that improving military to military relations between China and other countries around Asia and around its periphery, in

particular, is a very logical thing for China to do. It's been doing it now for many years; it's been sending out very significant numbers of military delegations all over the region, trying to improve its reputation and trying very much to put forward this logic of what is now described as China's peaceful emergence or peaceful rise. That this would develop into something more than dialogue, in some cases, is also not necessarily very surprising, although the idea of alliances and things like that would be very surprising. The Chinese have taken a very strong position against formal security alliances, certainly not posting their own forces overseas in the way the United States does.

But, the logic of this runs in two different directions, potentially, although it starts at the same place. You can strengthen relations with Asian countries to build confidence, but at the same time you can also establish structures by building confidence that allow you to make the argument, if you're China, that these countries don't need security alliances. They don't need a very high level U.S. presence in the region. Ultimately, you could have a military relationship here that can act as a security support that would convince or encourage countries to reduce the level of U.S. presence in the region.

Right now the United States, as part of its overall global War on Terror, but also predating the War on Terror, is trying to increase the level of its access and of its military around the world. The U.S. wants to be able to increase its deployments more rapidly, if necessary, for dealing with all kinds of things, and this includes in Asia. It's logical that China could see this as potentially directed against itself, because in truth it could potentially be directed against China. But there's no way to get around that logic of two major continental powers that have this kind of relationship of changing relative power.

Logically then, China would want to have a relationship with other countries in the region where it said, "Look, it's not necessary to have U.S. access in the region. It's not that important, and you don't need it. We have a viable security relationship here that could substitute for U.S. access." And they wouldn't lose anything by denying it. It's impossible at this stage of where we are to predict whether or not the Chinese would ultimately encourage movement in that direction, but a lot of people already suspect that that's going on. They suspect that part of China's logic here is to say to countries not only that it's good to reassure you that our rise is very benign, but also to say it's really good to also know that you don't need to respond so positively, necessarily, to U.S. efforts to try to increase its presence in the region, because it's just not necessary.

And over time, you can see how some countries might say, "Yes, that's probably the best way to go." You don't want to anger the Chinese as they emerge, and they're not threatening you in any direct way. Letting the U.S. in could produce a confrontation that might bleed over into our area, so why do it? I'm not saying that's motivated by a malevolent intent on the part of China, it's just a logical way to proceed to try and counter U.S. influence. It can ultimately cut in both directions.

Qin: I have one point to make. Both in China and the United States we have this

logical reasoning: one side takes a step, while the other side thinks about it. For example, when NATO expanded eastward, some Chinese scholars said, "Look, this is a step to encircle China." And when China improves its relations with some neighbors, then some people in the United States believe that is the counterbalance of U.S. influence in Asia. Of course, on each side there are people who think this way. Maybe it should be reasonable to think this way, but if we think about the other side of the story, if both sides always think this way, they will become enemies one day.

Remember, in today's world, the United States is the largest country. China has said they do not want to challenge the so-called leadership position of the United States in the world, does not want to drive the United States and decrease its influence in Asia. China is also a very fast-developing country. If we think about our international relations, our world situation, what would be the greatest disaster? It would be a conflict or armed conflict between the United States and China. Every responsible person, scholar, politician or whatever, should try their best to prevent this from occurring.

Questioner: My question is in regard to what China is doing in its attempt to settle the North Korean issue. This action is a very outstanding, sophisticated and interesting one, probably different from anything it's done since 1949. The question is, what do you think would happen with one of either or both of the following two contingencies?

First, that this effort succeeds and China is able to moderate the international community, particularly the other parties and main partners—the ROK, Korea, Japan and the United States—to get North Korea to back down on its nuclear project. Or, on the other hand, it fails. What if China attempts this, but it doesn't work, and there's a period of greater tension, maybe pitting China against some of the other parties? In any case, what do you think this would do for China's consciousness that you had set forth—international consciousness and international policy—if we assume that it either succeeds or does not succeed?

China's Role in Korea Has Been Active and Positive

Qin: The Korean Peninsula has been another hot spot for the world for quite a few years. First, I think that China's role so far has been quite active and positive. Because when the whole situation came into a deadlock, China's role was to bring the parties somewhat out of this deadlock, to come again to the negotiating table. This is the active role. Whether this will be a success or it will fail, I really cannot predict because all of these parties are now talking, and I think they have made some progress. This is the good side. On the other hand, we have some fundamental problems and some of them are very hard to solve. So I think this process will be long. I can only hope it will not fail, but if it fails, I really don't know what the other sides will do. But I don't think a failed situation will pit China against other parties. China is no longer the China of many, many years ago.

Questioner: You've talked about the growing sense of the Asian community and the growing integration of Asia, which is very true. You can look at the economic statistics, and you can look at

all the organizational meetings that are going on. But it seems to me that the leaders are far ahead of the popular level. I'm thinking particularly about Japan and China, where there is still a tremendous legacy of history at the popular level, and China has great resentment about the historical legacy there, such as Yasukuni and all that. In Japan, you're seeing a growing nationalism, growing reaction against the perceived efforts by China to play a Japan card for internal political reasons. My question really is, how big of a barrier is this legacy to a real sense of Asian community, and what more can be done to try to overcome this very negative heritage?

Historical Legacy Between China and Japan Still Influences Relationship

Qin: I think the historical legacy is very big. For China and Japan, I think there has been no substantial progress in their relations over the last three or four years. In talking about the East Asian community, we should know that both China and Japan are the two major players inside this process. The Asian community building process may differ from the European community because the Asian community concept, the initiative and efforts that have been made, and the leading roles have been played not by major powers, but by small powers, such as ASEAN countries. But if Asia or East Asia should become a community, the two major countries in the region, Japan and China, should cooperate. This is what I think, no doubt. The problem now is how to improve the relations between the two countries substantially. Then we come to the historical problem. The Japanese prime minister has been worshipping in a shrine and continues to do so. This has created a problem, a dilemma for the Chinese leaders, because many Chinese people still freshly remember the Japanese invasion, as well as the Second World War. I'll tell you one personal story. In the early 1970's, when my mother saw the Japanese national flag flying in China, she immediately had a strong resentment towards that, because during the anti-Japanese War, she took several of my brothers and sisters to run away and hide from the fighters. This is a big issue. To make substantial progress in this respect, I think both China and Japan should take positive action and make positive efforts. Maybe the Japanese side should take the first step.

Questioner: I would like to address this last question, as well as Dr. Legro's point on the identification of China with international societies. In fact, I was a little stunned that Dr. Legro brought out the case of Japan 80 years ago, or even 90-100 years ago, imitating Western powers to carve out and invade China. In fact, its membership in the League of Nations forbade that, and in fact, Japan had to withdraw from the League of Nations in order to pursue its militarist objectives. So, on the issue of the Yasukuni Shrine, of course, I think there is also a need to explain that the Yasukuni Shrine is, more or less, the equivalent of Arlington National Cemetery. And yes, there are seventeen Class A war criminals buried there, but there are also a million or two million others, mostly former soldiers who died for various reasons within and outside the country. And it is, for most Japanese, only proper that a prime minister should visit the shrine on certain days of the year.

But aside from that, the real identification issue, I think, is that Japan is not

what it used to be. For sixty years, Japan has been the only country that has not gone out and shot a single bullet outside its territories in any conflict. In fact, its constitution forbids Japan from participating in any military conflict overseas. The real danger of identification is that China is about to become the preeminent power in Asia. If it were to follow the other global preeminent powers in the world by going preemptively to change governments in other parts of the world, that, I think, is a real serious problem. If China were to follow in the United States' footsteps, I think that's a serious concern, and perhaps you can address that.

Legro: I just had a quick point. I wasn't referring to the interwar period, I was referring to the late 19th century. And I wasn't in any way castigating Japan, I was just trying to make the point that Japan was following the rules as they were. And were China to follow the rules today, that might be worrisome, too, depending on what precedents it picks.

Qin: First, about the shrine. I think you're right in saying that it has both war criminals and also many ordinary people, but now the shrine has become quite a political symbol. It's quite politically symbolic, so it does not serve only to show that this is the worship of ordinary Japanese people, but it also seems to other countries, to Asian nations, something that we could not bear—not only China, but other countries which were invaded and occupied by Japan during and before the Second World War. Since the people could not bear this, the policy makers have had very little room in which to maneuver. This is the first point I want to make.

The second is on whether China will try to change the regime of another society. I'm not quite sure about whether this question will be raised. Especially in the last two decades, China has not been trying to change the domestic political regimes of other countries. China has not been doing that by using force, so I don't have any grounds for predicting such behavior in the future.

Questioner: I think you put forward a very important question about China's perception of international society. Actually, China has really, in my view, gone through different actions during the past two decades. Now the problem is which force will push China harder. Do you think it's systematic dominance based on real politics, or just a learning process based on socialization? That's the question I'd like to ask Professor Ikenberry.

My second question is for Michael. I think the conservation of a geostrategic scenario in East Asia is still very dominant over China's vision about regional security and China's national security. But the problem is that China now is getting used to the fact that the United States could help boost China's security concern and security benefits. The problem for China is whether the United States will serve as a bad cop or a good cop. So, in your view, in East Asia so far, is the U.S. playing the role of a good cop or just a bad cop?

Questioner: A quick comment about the shrine issue. Let me just remind you of two facts. One is that since 1952, when Japan regained its sovereignty, until 1985 when Prime Minister Nakasone visited the Yasukuni Shrine—that made a big political debate in relations with

China—almost all prime ministers have visited the Yasukuni shrine almost every year and invited no criticism from either China or Korea. That's fact number one.

And number two is about Class A war criminals. Of course, the twenty-five Class A criminals were indicted, and seven of them were sentenced to death by hanging and are dead. But two of them, Mr. Fukai, or Mr. Shigemitsu, who were sentenced to life imprisonment, were later pardoned and released, then they became the vice justice minister and the vice prime minister. From the Japanese point of view, it seems very inconsistent that while those two gentlemen were allowed to go to a high position in Japanese politics, the others, like Tojo Hideki, were not even allowed to be enshrined into Yasukuni Shrine. I would like to just point these two facts.

Questioner: You said that one of the possible things that could derail China's current integration into the world community was bad relations with other countries, particularly the U.S. Aside from the obvious being Taiwan, what other potential issues do you see in the world that could deride China's integration with either the U.S. or other countries outside of the U.S?

Questioner: I came from Taiwan originnally. I have one comment. Taiwan's new President, Chen Shui-bian is in his second term. He has already said that Taiwan is already independent, and the ruling party DPP also said that. So I wish that in the next four years of Chen Shui-bian's term that Taiwan and China can learn from each other on many other issues that they can cooperate on together.

And I have a question for Dr. Qin. I enjoyed your speech very much and it opened up many doors to a way of thinking towards many resolutions in the world today. You mentioned China's international trade figures, but you did not mention the one with Taiwan, so do you have that number? And a question based on that is, what is your opinion on the interdependence of the trade issue with Taiwan and China? What has happened in the past, in your opinion, and what will be in the future for the next ten years?

Ikenberry: Well, with that I think we'll let our panelists sum up and then they can pick and choose and respond as they would like.

Qin: Let me choose the question from the person from Taiwan. Your question is on the trade between the mainland and Taiwan. I think that is a very important factor. I don't have the specific data here, but it has been increasing dramatically. The level of interdependence between mainland and Taiwan has also been increasing. I'll tell you an interesting story. We were talking with some university students in Fuchien Province; we were talking about cooperation during some of our courses. And then we said, making a joke, if Taiwan attacked Fuchien, we would lose money there if we had invested there. The Fuchien people said, "No, they would not attack us, they would attack you." The economic interdependence is an important factor to reduce the potential for armed conflict. Now, if you go to Shanghai you will see how many Taiwan businessmen go there. I hope this will increase the trust between the two sides, and continue to open new channels for ways of cooper-

ation and understanding. I think this is important.

Causes for Optimism in East Asia Despite Tensions

Legro: I just have one closing comment which is, despite the questioning nature of my responses to Qin Yaqing, I think his thesis is basically right. There are causes for optimism in East Asia, even though there are obvious tensions, and one of those causes for optimism is certainly the dramatic change in China's attitude towards international society over the past twenty-five years. But the other is instructional in nature and that is that even if the equalization of power between China and the U.S. occurs, it need not inevitably lead to conflict in East Asia. There's a natural kind of balance there, too, between a land power and a maritime power. I'm somewhat less pessimistic than perhaps Michael is that increasing Chinese influence in Asia will lead to the diminishment of U.S. influence. I think a lot of these smaller Asian countries have an extremely strong incentive to keep the U.S. very actively involved. As some countries move closer to China, others will perhaps welcome the U.S. presence in a way they haven't in the past.

Swaine: Did I understand you correctly that you were asking if China looks at the U.S. today as basically a good cop or a bad cop, as a good force in the region or a bad force in the region? This is the subject of a whole other seminar. It's not as simple an answer as you might think. I think in some ways, the Chinese see that the United States plays a beneficial role in the region. It does serve to moderate regional rivalries because of its presence, to a certain degree. It is a major economic player, and the United States is for the Chinese a very critical state. China's grand strategy today is based upon the idea of maintaining workable, if not cordial relations with the United States. It's absolutely essential to all of China's other strategic objectives. Thus, if China gets into a confrontation with the United States over a variety of issues, it threatens to undermine the very logic of the whole reform-era security strategy that it's had in place for over twenty years.

Both China and the U.S. are Motivated to Cooperate

In Asia, China has an incentive to look for ways to cooperate with the United States. And I think China has a greater ability to do this, in my opinion, since the events of September the 11th, in the context of the global War on Terror. It has a greater incentive, and there's a greater strategic logic on both sides to do this, so I think both sides have a strong motivation to cooperate, and that's what they're doing in many ways. At the same time, I think from a Chinese leadership position, it's very logical for the Chinese government to try to reduce U.S. influence in the region in certain ways, because of the long term potential for the U.S. influence in the region to be used to constrain China.

We can argue about how realistic that is, or not, but there is a great concern within China that that is in fact what the United States, in the long term, will ultimately end up doing or trying to do. To hedge against that, you don't want to sanction or endorse all aspects of the U.S. presence in the region, particularly those aspects that assume increased influence or increased power in various areas. I think

it's logical for the Chinese to try to hedge against that, and I think they're doing that. Now, does that mean it's a good cop or a bad cop? Well, you know, it depends. In some areas, the U.S. is a bad cop. In regard to a lot of aspects of relations with Taiwan, as Yaqing just said, U.S. arms sales to Taiwan has not been a positive thing, from the Chinese perspective. They want the U.S. to change its approach to Taiwan, and they're not happy at all with some aspects of U.S. policy there, although they certainly like the fact that the U.S. put pressure on Chen Shui-bian last December. But that's a very delicate issue, and so you've got the potential there for real controversy.

In other areas though, I think the Chinese see the U.S. role as still being very beneficial. It needs to have its economic presence across the region. The Chinese are cooperating with the U.S. to engage a whole lot of international issues, too many to mention here. And on the Korean Peninsula I think there is a common objective in many ways, although the ultimate objective obviously is that China does not want a Korean Peninsula that one, either devolves into chaos and creates a potential for conflict within the peninsula, drawing in the United States and China, or two, a unified Korean Peninsula that is dominated or has a strong U.S. influence in it. Now, I'm not sure the United States wants to be dominant on the Korean Peninsula either, in terms of military presence. But that being said, there's a very strong set of objectives there for peace, stability and all the rest on the Korean Peninsula. And the U.S. and Chinese, I think, are trying to work towards that objective. The U.S. is not seen as a negative power in that respect, in terms of those objectives, although there are certain options there that the Chinese don't want the U.S. to pursue. It's a really complicated issue, but as I say, it depends on how you look at the region and what issue you're dealing with.

Ikenberry: Well, on that note of geopolitical complexity, I think we'll draw this to an end. It's a compliment to our speakers and certainly to our main speaker that the questions and issues have been so lively and so important. Would you join with me in thanking our panelists for a terrific presentation.

[End]

China's Foreign Policy Choices and Security Strategies in East Asia

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China’s Foreign Policy Choices

Three possible foreign policy choices:

- Aggressive nationalism
- Utilitarian realism
- Cooperative internationalism

Why has China chosen such a strategy?

-redefining national identity

-reconstructing strategic culture

-reconsidering national security interests

I. National Identity

What a state is in relation to international society in terms of the identification between the two.

Three Types of National Identity

Status quo states

Detached states

Revisionist states

CHART 1


International society and national identity
status quo state
1
identification with int'l society
0
detached state
-1
revisionist state
national identity

CHART 2

Redefinition of National Identity

Period	Identity type
1949-1971	Revisionist
1972-1979	Detached
1980-present	Status quo

CHART 3

Foreign trade : GDP

Year	%
1980	12.6
1985	23.0
1990	30.0
1995	40.2
2002	50.2

CHART 4



Source: Alastair Iain Johnston, "Is China a Status Quo Power?"

CHART 5

China's participation in multilateral international conventions

Year	Number of international conventions joined by China
1949-1979	34
1980-2002	220

II. Strategic Culture

- Role of war in human affairs
  - aberrant or inevitable
- Nature of rivalry
  - zero-sum or variable sum
- Efficacy of violence
  - effective or not

CHART 6

Three dimensions of strategic culture



Two types of strategic culture

Conflicting strategic culture

Cooperative strategic culture

CHART 7

Formation of a new strategic culture

	before 1979	since 1979
role of war	+	-
nature of rivalry	+	-
efficacy of violence	+	-

CHART 8

III. Security Interests



CHART 9

China's Security Interests

Period	Security interests
1949-1969	political + military
1970-1979	military
1980-present	economic; multi-level/dimensional

CHART 10

International armed conflicts involving China

year	war involving China
1950-53	Korean War
1962	China-India border war
1969	China-SU border war
1979	China-Vietnam border war

China’s Security Strategy

in East Asia

Security Objectives in East Asia

-Sovereignty and territorial integrity

-Friendly neighborhood

-regional stability

Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity

- Taiwan
- South China Sea islands

Friendly Neighborhood

- ASEAN
- Japan
- Korean Peninsular

Regional stability

- North-East Asia
- South-East Asia

Approaches to objectives

- Security through community
- Security through institutions
- Security through interdependence
- Security through cooperation

Security through community

- Joined the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia
- Made the initiative to establish the East Asian FTA
- Signed the Joint Declaration for promoting cooperation among China, Japan, and ROK

CHART 11

Security through institutions

- 10+3
- 10+1
- APEC (Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation)
- ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum)
- ACD (Asian Cooperation Dialogue)
- ESCAP (Eco. and Soc. Commission for Asia and Pacific)
- GMS (Greater Mekong Sub-region Cooperation)

Security through cooperation

- Six-party talks over the Korean nuclear issue
- Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (2002)
- Top leaders' visits to 13 neighboring countries
- Top leaders' visits to China from neighboring countries

CHART 12

Security through interdependence

(China's international trade in 2003-billion USD)

Total	851.200	100%
Asia	495.500	58%
Japan	133.574	16%
ROK	62.231	7%
ASEAN	78.252	9%

Security Choices

- New Security Concept
- Institutionalism
- Open regionalism

Future

An East Asian Regional Security Community?

About the Panelists

Main Speaker

Dr. Qin Yaqing is Vice President and Professor of International Studies, China Foreign Affairs University. He began working at the university in 1983, serving as a lecturer, associate professor and dean of the Department of English and International Studies, and later as assistant president before beginning his current position. He has also taught at Stephen's College in Missouri and the University of Missouri-Columbia. Dr. Qin is a member of the editorial board of *Global Governance*, Deputy Editor-in-Chief of the *Journal of China Foreign Affairs University*, and a member of the Chinese Association of International Relations. He received his B.A. from Shandong Normal University, and an M.A. and Ph.D. from the University of Missouri-Columbia. Dr. Qin has published many books and articles, including *Twenty Years' Crisis* (forthcoming), *Perception and Misperception in International Politics (2003), a*nd *Contemporary China and Its Foreign Policy* (2003).

Discussants

Dr. Jeff Legro is Associate Professor in the Woodrow Wilson Department of Politics, University of Virginia. A specialist on international relations, Dr. Legro has served as a consultant to foundations, think tanks, and government agencies. In 2002-03 he was a Fulbright professor at China Foreign Affairs University. He has been awarded fellowships or grants from the Council on Foreign Relations, U.S. Institute of Peace, the Ford Foundation, and Harvard University's Olin Institute and Center for Science and International Affairs. Dr. Legro received a B.A. from Middlebury College and has an M.A. and Ph.D. from UCLA. He is the author of *Cooperation Under Fire: Anglo-German Restraint During World War II* (1995), a contributor to *The Culture of National Security* (Peter Katzenstein, ed. 1996), and has published articles in such journals as *Foreign Policy* and *American Political Science Review*.

Dr. Michael Swaine is a Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He specializes in Chinese security and foreign policy, U.S.-China relations, and East Asian international relations. Previously he was at the RAND Corporation for 12 years, where he was a senior political scientist in international studies and research director of the RAND Center for Asia-Pacific Policy. Prior to joining RAND, Dr. Swaine was a consultant with a private sector firm, a postdoctoral fellow at the University of California, Berkeley, and a research associate at Harvard University. Dr. Swaine received a B.A. from George Washington University and an A.M. and Ph.D. from Harvard University. He has written *Ballistic Missiles and Missile Defense in Asia* (co-author, 2002), *Taiwan's Foreign and Defense Policies: Features and Determinants* (co-author, 2001), and *Japan and Ballistic Missile Defense* (co-author, 2001).

Moderator

Dr. G. John Ikenberry is the Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University. Previously he taught at Georgetown University. Dr. Ikenberry also has been a Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and a Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars. He earned his Ph.D. at the University of Chicago. Dr. Ikenberry is the author of numerous publications, including *State Power and World Markets: The International Political Economy* (2002), *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars* (2000), and *Reasons of State: Oil Politics and the Capacities of American Government* (1988).